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Interline corrections are those of Mr.



who reviewed the condensed

version.

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*This has been approved by
DAD/O*



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1st draft
Condensed version

Office of Operations

Sovmat Staff

In all recent wars, much technical intelligence has been derived from the examination and testing of enemy material. No activity comparable to the Sovmat program existed, however, in the pre-CIG days. In 1945-46, it must be recalled that we were emerging from a period in which our military alliance and wartime sympathies rendered repugnant to many, the idea of trying to discover what the Russians were going to do and what they were going to do it with.

In August 1947, a meeting was held by representatives of the IAC agencies to discuss the possibility of examining articles produced within the Soviet sphere of influence as indices of Soviet capabilities in war and peace. Nothing resulted from the meeting except a general indorsement of the scheme and a tacit recommendation that something be done about it, preferably by CIA.



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By 1949, considerably more American concern with Soviet intentions and capabilities was evident, and the "Sovmat" idea was revived.

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1 October 1949 a State Department dispatch from Moscow emphasized the importance of collecting and analyzing Soviet material. In December, ORE submitted requirements for the acquisition of several items of Soviet production. The difficulty of fulfilling these requirements led to a series of conferences designed to establish an integrated program for getting on with the business.

This program was implemented 26 July 1950 by the appointment of a Chief, Sovmat Staff, who with a secretary made up the total personnel until 19 September 1951. Operations were so limited that very little of the fund of [] provided for the project was expended.

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in accordance with the original plan,
For FY '51, ~~no action taken~~ the sum of [] was allocated, to be made available as needed. A project approved 18 June 1951 (for FY '52) provided for four field collection teams to participate with the military services in obtaining and analyzing []

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[] This endeavor naturally called for enlargement of the staff.

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As presently constituted, the Sovmat Staff has no field organization, but operates out of headquarters on temporary duty. In the field it relies on the facilities already established by the Intelligence Agencies.

During fiscal year 1951, the Sovmat Staff produced and released

25X1 [] Information Reports of the [] Series covering [] 25X1 25X1
items. With the exception of one report evaluated C-2, all evaluations of this output were either "A" (of considerable value) or "B" (of value).

During fiscal year 1952 (to 20 January 1952), 24 CIA Information Reports have been produced by the Sovmat Staff, representing the analyses of

25X1 [] separate items. No evaluation lower than "B" has been reported, ~~for these reports.~~

25X1 To date (20 January 1952), the Sovmat Staff has succeeded in collecting [] items of Soviet and Satellite production. The difference between the number of items collected [] and the number of items for which analyses have been reported [] is composed essentially of items not warranting technical exploitation because of their poor condition, items turned over to other IAC Agencies for technical

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examination and reporting appropriate to the potential of the selected agencies, certain items found more valuable (because of duplication and other factors) for operational use than for intelligence exploitation, and items in process of examination for which reports will be issued later.

Neither the number of items collected nor the number of reports released is, by itself, an accurate index of production because an item may consist of a box of identical pills capable of yielding information only from a limited series of tests, or it may consist of a complete vehicle or aircraft comprising thousands of components, each of which warrants some technical examination. Similarly, a report may consist of five sentences, ~~of significant intelligence information~~, or it may consist of 465 pages of print.

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The only type of publication ever issued by the Sovmat Staff is the CIA Information Report. Sovmat information reports are distinctively numbered in a series. All Sovmat report numbers contain the prefix

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Actual items of Soviet and Satellite production are collected in accordance with requirements coordinated by the Sovmat Staff through action of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Forces, as well as by field personnel of the OSO and Contact Division, OO.

Collection of items is usually adequate for purposes of technical analysis ~~for which they are collected~~ in very small numbers, while the

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Through this interpretation, the

Techniques and Methods Division of ORR is able to make accurate estimates concerning Soviet production in various categories as well as the cost to the Soviet economy in terms of manpower, materials, and machine capacity inherent in that production.

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are located and

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selected in accordance with

the requirements of the T & M Division, ORR.

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[REDACTED] 25X1

In addition to collecting Sovmat items [REDACTED]

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the Sovmat Staff collects information about material objects of Soviet and allied production, through technical examinations of the actual items. These technical examinations may consist of chemical, physical, metallurgical, or other analyses. Such analyses are performed by U. S. Government technical facilities such as the U. S. Bureau of Standards, by educational institutions such as the Stevens Institute of Technology, and by commercial and industrial organizations such as the U. S. Steel Corporation, Du Pont, and the Chrysler Corporation.

Arrangements for technical work are completed by personnel of the Sovmat Staff with the assistance of appropriate CIA Staffs and Services. Initial contact with non-government facilities is made by

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which frequently acts as agent for the

Sovmat Staff in field activity necessary to complete specific tests.

U. S. Government technical facilities are approached initially through

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~~the~~ OCD. Activities necessary to complete required tests are then controlled by the Sovmat Staff.

The first attempt to accomplish inter-agency coordination necessary to prevent duplication among ^{the} material-object intelligence-exploitation activities of all agencies, was through the formation of a sub-committee of the Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC), which was called the Joint Soviet Materials Intelligence Committee (JSMIC). During August of 1950, representatives from each of the IAC Agencies were appointed to serve on the JSMIC, the CIA providing the Chairman. This committee was never effective in any way.

The representative of the Department of the Army held from the beginning, that no CIA program for the exploitation of Soviet and Satellite objects other than consumer's goods was legitimate, and that all exploitation of captured military equipment and supplies was a function of the agencies comprising the Department of National Defense.

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These objections, with attendant, time-consuming debates, drafting and redrafting of terms of reference, and the soon-disclosed lack of authority on the part of committee members to act, finally led the SIC to recommend the abolition of the JSMIC. In this recommendation, which was accepted and acted upon 23 May 1951, the SIC held that coordination and planning of the actions of the Sovmat Program were not functions properly assigned to a subcommittee of the SIC.

Thus was the Sovmat program dealt a ~~major~~^{severe} blow in its infancy. Lacking authority to direct coordination, the SIC subcommittee proved inept in persuasion designed to accomplish coordination by mutual agreement. A large measure of resentment brewed by this maneuvering was bequeathed to the Sovmat Staff. Fortunately, with ^{the} passage of time and changes of ~~assignment~~^{personnel}, most of the antagonism has evaporated.

Early in 1951, ~~At this time~~ the JCS had directed the JIC to work on the problem of coordinating military handling of Captured Enemy Materiel (CEM). As a result the Joint Materiel Intelligence Agency (JMIA) ^{created and} was assigned the mission of coordinating the program of the exploitation of foreign

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equipment and the dissemination of information concerning it.

The CIA is given representation on JMIA through an "advisor" to the Director JMIA. By fortunate coincidence it happens that this "advisor" is a member of the Sovmat Staff and by arrangement with State and AEC ~~the~~ also represents their interests in matters/~~of concern~~ that concern Soviet objects
/ ~~to~~ each of the three non-military agencies.
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Currently, no formal requirement for coordination of activities of the Sovmat type with those of foreign Governments has been placed on the Office of Operations. Liaison has been established, however, on Soviet material matters, [REDACTED]

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Reports of the technical examination of Soviet and Satellite objects are
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exchanged between the CIA [REDACTED]

to employ certain collection facilities in acquiring needed items for Sovmat analysis, and to obtain certain technical services in the analysis of items in which ~~the~~ CIA is interested.

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A major obstacle to the accomplishment of the Sovmat mission has been the dearth of opportunity to acquire or even to examine Soviet products. Traditionally, the USSR has been an exporter of materials and an importer of finished products. While substantial progress has been made, the USSR is still far from producing a significant surplus of processed items for export. Such items as are exported are likely to be placed where they will do the most political good for mother Russia. This results in collection difficulties naturally attending attempts to take subsidised exports out of Communist hands without breach of USA Security. Likewise, Soviet military equipment representative of Russia's best technological achievements is heavily guarded and rarely committed in combat where it is exposed to capture.

Despite all difficulties, there is good potential for acquiring limited quantities of Soviet products for technical examination. The problem is to make these limited opportunities count to the utmost. This can be accomplished only by the establishment of the very best requirements to guide collectors in spending money, time, and possibly men, where the results will be most telling. Educational efforts are continuing with the objective of drawing forth from all users of Sovmat information the most significant guidance obtainable for the formulation of needed requirements.

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